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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREED FINANCE COMPNAY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
W. J. PREECE, WILLIAM V. Case No. 9858 
PREE1CE and PREECE 
MOTOR, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants, 
WILLIAM V. PREECE, 
Defendant and Appelant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STAITEMENIT OF THE KIND ·OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, 
Freed Finance Company, a corporation, against 
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, which was licens-
ed to sell new 1and used automobiles under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, for amounts 
due under the terms and conditions of the purchase 
of certain conditional sale con tracts for the sale 
of automobiles from said Preece Motor, Inc. 
Also against the individual defendants, W. J. 
Preece and William V. Preece, officers of Preece 
Motor, Inc., a corporation, under the terms and 
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conditions of an unconditional written guaranty 
to Freed Finance Company, guaranteeing the pay-
ment of any and all sums due and owing from 
Preece Motor, Inc. to Freed Finance Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'T 
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, and W. J. 
Preece, an individual defendant, by their counsel, 
stipulated in open court that if proof were adduced, 
$10,000.00 would be found to be due and owing 
Freed Finance Company from Preece Motor, Inc. ; 
that W. J. Preece, under and by virtue of said 
guaranty of the obligations of Preece Motor, Inc. 
to Freed Finance would be owing $10,000.00. Preece 
Mdtor, Inc. and W. J. Preece further stipulated that 
judgment could be entered against each of them 
for the amount of $10,000.00. 
Wm. V. Preece, by his attorney, entered into 
a written stipla:tion with the attorneys for Freed 
Finance Company that if said Freed Finance Com-
pany adduced evidence in support of the allegations 
of its complaint, it could prove that Preece Motor 
Inc. was indebted in the sum of $10,000.00 to Freed 
Finance Company as of February 29, 1960. By 
virtue of said stipulation, judgment was entered 
against Wm. V. Preece in the sum of $10,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON A:PPEAL 
'The defendant and appellant, William V. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Preece, seeks reversal of the judgment entered 
against him, and dismissal of the action as against 
him. This respondent and plaintiff seeks an affirm-:-
ance of said judgment of $10,000.0Q as entered by 
the lower court in favor of Freed Finance Company 
as against William V. Preece. 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
Freed Finance Company is a corporation or-
ganized and existing under and by virtue of the 
laws of the State of Utah, and was doing business 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the purchasing of notes 
and conditional sales contracts. (T. 75-76) That 
Preece Motor, Inc., prior to February, 1960, was 
engaged in the automobile business at Layton, Utah, 
in the selling of new and used automobiles. That 
Freed Finance Company was doing business with 
them in purchasing contracts. That is, conditional 
sale contracts in which the sU!bject matter thereof 
was ·the sale of motor vehicles on the installment 
plan. It was doing business with them prior to 1960 
as a partnership, tha:t is, W. J. Preece and William 
V. Preece, doing business under the firm name and 
style of Preece Motor Co. That subsequent thereto, 
the assets of the partnership were transferred to 
a corporation known as Preece Motor, Inc., and that 
Preece Motor, Inc. did business as had been pre-
viously done by the partnership. 
In February, 1960, M. R. Weiler, Vice Presi-
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dent of Freed Finance Company, had a conversa-
tion with W. J. Preece, in which he stated that 
in order to continue business with the Preece Motor 
Inc., that the Freeds would h'ave to have the 
personal endorsement of W. J. and William V. 
Preece, and that if this could not be done, it would 
be necessary to take over the company and close it 
out. That is, that they would not continue to do 
business with Preece M1dtor Inc., (T. 77-78) Mr. 
Weller gave to Mr. Preece Exhibit 1, which is the 
guaranty agreement. 
At the time Exhibit 1 (guaranty agreement) 
was given to W. J. Preece, there was filled in on 
the agreement the name of the company, the sig-
natures on the financial statement, and all of the 
typewritten information was set forth therein. W. 
J. Preece, President, had also signed on Exhibit 1 
for Preece Motor, Incorporated ('Tr. 78, 79). There 
is no question that Mr. Weiler did not see either of 
the defendants, W. J. Preece or Wm. V. Preece, 
sign the document known as Exhibit 1, which is 
the guaranty agreement ( Tr. 80) . W. J. Preece 
and Wm. V. Preece did business under the firm name 
and style of Preece Motor Company as a partner-
ship until 1959. In February of 1959, the assets of 
the partnership were then transferred to the corpor-
ation of Preece Motor, Incorporated, one of the de-
fendants herein (Tr. 82). The defendants, W. J. 
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Preece and Wm. V. Preece took stock in the corpor-
ation in consideration of the assets of the partner-
ship to the corporation of about fifty-fifty ('Tr. 83). 
W. J. Preece testified that his signature appears on 
Exhibit 1 in the guaranty part as the President 
of Preece Motor, Incorporated, and that he signed 
the same ( Tr. 83). 
W. J. Preece testified that Mr. Weiler told 
him that it was necessary to have his signature as 
a guarantee, as well as his father's, and that with-
out them they would refuse to do business with 
Preece Motor, Incorporated; that is, it was neces-
sary to have the signatures of W. J. Preece and 
Wm. V. Preece, the former partners (Tr. 83). W. 
J. Preece testified that he signed his name on the 
back of Exhibit 1 on the guaranty part. That he also 
signed his father's name, Wm. V. Preece, on the 
same side. Mr. Preece testified that, thinking he 
had a power of attorney, he signed his father's name. 
That he executed Exhibit 1, that is, his father's sig-
nature, Wm. V. Preece, by virtue of a power of 
attorney (Tr. 84). Exhibit 2-P (Tr. 85, 86) was 
a power of attorney, as testified to by W. J. Preece 
as executed by W m. V. Preece. 
It was the only intent of the plaintiff to as-
certain the truth and factual situation in this mat-
ter and, therefore, the following questions by the 
attorney for Freed Finance Company: 
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Q. (By Mr. Callister) Now am I to under-
stand, Mr. Preece, that this power of at-
tourney was to terminate upon your 
father's return from his mission? 
A. (By W. J. Preece) Well, Mr. Callister, 
actually if you say do I understand it 
tha!t way, my answer is no. * * * (Tr. 
91 ) . (Italics ours) 
Mr. Weiler had asked W. J. Preece to get his father's 
signature on the guaranty (Tr. 9'2). Exhibit 1, the 
guaranty, was given to Mr. Weiler and nothing 
was said 'a!bout the fact that the signature was his 
father's by virtue of a power of attorney (Tr. 92, 
93) . We quote the following ('Tr. 9'3) : 
Q. Now if I understand you, you want us 
'to believe that at the time you signed it 
that you thought you had a power of at-
torney but now that since you have had 
further thought on the matter, it is your 
impression that the power of attorney 
was to terminate upon your father's re-
turn, is that right? 
A. No, that is not exactly right. 
We quote the following with regard to the 
power of attorney, Exnibit 2-P (Tr. 94): 
Q. 
A. 
(By Mr. Callilster) Well, did he indicate 
to you the time in which this power of 
a!ttorney would exist, was there anything 
said as to that? 
(By W. J. Preece) No. 
* * * * 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Well then, Mr. Preece, 
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it is a fact, isn't it, that you have testi-
fied that it was given to you for the 
duration of the absence from the states 
or the country by your father, was that 
right, and he so advised? 
A. (By W. J. Preece) No, sir, he didn't. This 
is three times I have told you that. (Italics 
ours) 
Mr. Weiler informed W. J. Preece that he would 
not continue to give credit to the corporation unless 
Exhibit 1 was signed by him and his father, Wm. V. 
Preece (Tr. 95). 
Wm. V. Preece, appellant, testified as follows 
(Tr. 102) : 
Q. Well now, just tell us whether or not you 
had a conversation with him as to the 
time limlit of the power of attorney? 
A. I don't remember any conversation to 
that effect. 
We quote the following ( Tr. 103) : 
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece (W. V. Preece), 
take your time and think back. For you 
to have an understanding that this was 
only to be in force and effect during your 
absence while on a mission, wasn't there 
something said between you and your 
son with regard to that subject matter? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't think there was, I don't remember. 
Then how did you get the understanding 
as you said, you said there was an under-
standing that this wa:s only to prevail, 
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that is the power of attorney, while you 
were absent from the States? 
A. Well, that was my understanding in my 
own thinking. There was never no agree-
ment to that effect. We never did have 
no conversation on it, as I remember. 
(Italics ours) 
Q. And there was no agreement to th'at ef-
fect? 
A. Not as I remember. 
We further quote (Tr. 104) : 
Q. Well, now, 1surely, Mr. Preece (W. V. 
Preece) , didn't you have some under-
standing as you state 'that this was only 
to last for the period of your mission? 
A. There was no conversation to that effect. 
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece, have you ever tak-
en any ~action or taken any steps to term-
inate or to bring to an end this power of 
attorney, proposed Exhibit 2? 
A. No sir. 
We further quote ('Tr. 109) : 
Q. 
A. 
(By Mr. Callister) 'Then if I understand 
you correctly, at no 'time did you ever 
have any conversation with your son with 
respect to the length of time which this 
power of attorney would be in effect? 
(By Wm. V. Preece) That is correct. 
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A'RGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE1RE IS SUFFI'CIE'N·T EVIDEN'CE IN THE 
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COUR'T'S FIND-
ING AND CONC:UUSION AND JUDGMENT. 
'This court has announced certain cardin,a.l rules 
that must be kept in mind with respect to the sound-
n~ss of the trial court's conclusion and judgment. 
These are that the judgment is endowed with a 
presumption of validity; that the party attacking 
it has the 'burden of ~affirmatively showing tha!t it 
is in error; and that the evidence and all inferences 
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom 
must be viewed in the light most favorable _to it. 
Cheney vs. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86. Charlton vs. Hackett. 
360 ·P.2d 176. 
There is 'ample and sufficient evidence in the 
record to ~support the trial court's finding that W. 
J. Preece, by virtue of a power of attorney from 
Wm. V. Preece, appellant herein, affixed the name 
of W m. V. Preece to the guaranty ( Exhihi t 1). 
W. J. Preece, the son, testified that Mr. Weiler 
told him that it was necessary to have his signature 
'as a guarantee, as well as his father's, and that 
without them they would refuse to do business with 
Preece Mo'tor, Incorporated ; that is, it was neces-
sary to have the signatures df W. J. Preece and Wm. 
V. Preece, the former partners ('Tr. 83). W. J. 
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Preece testified that he signed his name on the back 
of Exhibit 1 on the guaranty part. That he also 
signed hi's f'ather's name, Wm. V. Preece, on the 
same side. Mr. Preece testified that, thinking he had 
a power of a!ttorney, he signed his father's name. 
That he executed Exhibit 1, that is his father's sig-
nature, Wm. V. Preece, by virtue of a power of 
attorney CTr. 84). Exhibit 2-P (Tr. 85, 86) was 
a power of attorney, 'as testified to by W. J. Preece 
aJs executed by Wm. V. Pree·ce. 
No 'action or steps were ever 'taken 'by W m. V. 
Preece to terminate or bring to an end the power of 
attorney (Ex. 2) fTr. 104). 
We are taking the liberty df repeating, for the 
convenience of the court, excerpts of the tes'timony 
In support of the judgment. 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Now am I to under-
stand, Mr. Preece, that this power of 
attorney was to terminate upon your 
faJther's return from his mission? 
A. (By W. J. Preece) Well, Mr. Callister, 
actually if you say do I understand it 
that way, my answer is no. * * * ('Tr. 
91). 
We quote the following ('Tr. 913): 
Q. Now if I understand you, you want us 
to believe that at the time you signed it 
10 
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that you thought you had a power of 
attorney but now that since you have 
had further thought on 'the matter, it is 
your impression that the power of at-
torney was to terminate upon your 
fiather's return, is that right? 
A. No, that is not exa'ctly right. 
We quote the following with regard to the 
power of attorney, Exhibit 2-P, (Tr. 94): 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Well, did he indicate 
'to you the time in which this power of 
attorney would exist, was there anything 
said as to tha;t? 
A. (ByW. J. Preece) No. 
* * * * 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Well then, Mr. Preece, 
it is a fact, isn't it, tha:t you have testi-
fied that it was given to you for the dur-
ation of the alJsence from the states or 
the country by your father, was that 
right, and he so advised? 
A. (By W. J. Preece) No, sir, he didn't. This 
is three times I have told you th'at. 
Mr. Weiler informed W. J. Preece thaJt he 
would not continue to give credit to the corporation 
unless Exhi!bit 1 was signed by him and his father, 
Wm. V. Preece ('Tr. 95). 
Wm. V. Preece testified as follows (Tr. 102): 
11 
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Q. Well now, just tell us whether or not you 
had a conversation with him as to the 
time limit of the power of attorney? 
A. I don't remember any conversation to 
that effect. 
We quote the :following (Tr. 103) : 
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece, take your time 
and think back. For you to have an under-
standing tha:t this was only to be in force 
and effect during your absence while on 
a mission, wasn't there something said 
between you and your son with regard 
to that subject matter? 
A. I don't think there was, I don't remember. 
Q. Then how did you get the understanding 
as you said, you said there was an under-
standing that this was only to prevail, 
that is the power of attorney, while you 
were absent from the States? 
A. Well, that was my understanding in my 
own think'ing. There was never no agree-
ment to that effect. We never did have 
no conversation on it, as I remember. 
Q. And there was no agreement to that ef-
fect? 
A. Not as I remember. 
We further quote (Tr. 104): 
Q. Well, now, surely, Mr. Preece, didn't you 
have some understanding as you state 
that this was only to last for the period 
of your mission? 
12 
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A. There was no conversation to that effect. 
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece, have you ever ·tak-
en any action or taken any steps to term-
inate or to bring to an end this power 
of attorney, proposed Exhibit 2? 
A. No, sir. 
We further quote (Tr. 109): 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Then if I unde~stand 
you correctly, at no time did you ever 
have any conversation with your son with 
respect to the length of time which this 
power of attorney would be in effect? 
A. (By Wm. V. Preece) That is correct. 
From the foregoing there is no question that 
the judgment entered by the trial court finds sup-
port. In a law a;cti'on ~the question on appeal is not 
whether the evidence would have supported a judg-
ment in favor of appellant, but whether the judg-
ment entered by the tri,al court finds support in the 
evidence. Green vs. Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety of the United States, 284 P.·2d 69'5. 
The Supreme Court will not redetermine facts 
found by the fact finder in a lower court of law cases 
if, in the light most favorable to the respondent, 
the evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings. 
Gibbons and Reed Co. vs. Guthrie, '256 P.2d 706. 
On appeal from the judgment of the court try-
13 
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ing facts, question for Supreme Court is, not which 
party should be believed, but whether there is evi-
dence directly or inferentially supporting trial 
court's decision, which must be upheld, if inferences 
supporting lower court's conclusions on probabilities 
of circumstantial evidence may be drawn therefrom, 
though Supreme Court might have stressed infer-
ences adverse to such conclusion had it tried case. 
- Lym v. Thompson, 1'84 P.2d 667, 112 Utah 24. 
'The review of the Supreme Court in law cases 
is limited to the determination of whether or not 
there is competent evidence to support the judgment 
of the trial court. - Dahnken v. George Romney 
& Sons Co., 184 P.2d 211, 111 Utah 471. 
POINT II. 
W. J. PREECE ACTED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY IN EXECUTING 
THE GUARANTY, AND THE POWER OF-ATTORNEY 
HAD NEVER BEEN TERMINATEU AND WAS IN 
FULL FO'R'CE AND EFFE1CT AT THE TIME OF THE 
EXECUTION OF THE WRITTEN GUARANTY. 
Questions concerning agents holding powers of 
attorney, that is, concerning attorneys in fact, are 
not substantially and basically different from those 
pertaining to agents generally, 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Page 
434, Section 2'4. 
The power of attorney, Exhibit 1, is the broad-
est type of power of attorney that could be drawn. 
14 
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It, without question, authorizes the execution of 
the written guaranty by W. J. Preece. 
Moreover, the principal is bound when 
the agent and a third person have acted in 
regard to an ob'j ect permitted in he power 
granted, even though the mode of action is 
open to question, and the court, upon a critical 
examination of 'the language used, might be 
of the opinion that a different construction 
would be more correct. If the authorization 
is 1ambiguous because of facts of which the 
agent has no notice, he has authority to act 
in accordance with what he reasonably be-
lieves to be the intent of the principal, al-
though this is contrary to the principal's ac-
tual intent; if the agent should realize its 
ambiguity, his authority, except in the case 
of an emergency, is only to act in accordance 
with the principal's intent. The rule thus 
~tated p}aces upon the principal the burden 
of reasonable mistakes made by the agent in 
the interpretation of his authorization caused 
by facts of which the agent has no notice. 
2 AM. Jur. 35, § 3'3. See cases cited. 
The execution of ExHibit 1, was within the 
scope of the power of attorney. 
The relation of principal and agent can be 
terminated only by the act or agreement of the 
parties to the agency, or by oper~aJtion of law. 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Page 440, Section 3'4. See cases cited. 
The burden of proving the termin'ation of an 
agency is on the principal, and once established, the 
agency, if the termination is not shown, i,s presumed 
to continue. Exchange State Bank v. Occident Eleva-
15 
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tor Company, 24 P.2d 130. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Page 706, 
Section 348. See cases cited. 
When the agency has once been shown to have 
existed, the relation will be presumed to have con-
tinued, in the absence of anything to show its term-
ination; and the burden of proving a revocation or 
other termination of an agency is on the party as-
serting it. 3 A·m. Jur. 2d, Page 440, Section 34. See 
cases cited. 
In the case before this Honorable Court, there 
was no specified time for the duration of the power 
of 1atorney; from the facts and circumstances in 
this case there was no conversation between the 
parties as to its termination date; therefore, it 
would be presumed to have continued to be in force 
and effect until terminaJted by the principal. 
In view of the fact that the power of tattorney 
did not have an expiration date, and that there was 
no agreement between the principal and agent 1as 
to its termination, that the trial court rightfully 
concluded that it was in force and effect until such 
time as i't was terminated by the principal. The son, 
W. J. Preece, testified very emphatically that at the 
time he executed the guaranty, Ex. 1, inserting his 
father's name, he did so, thinking he h!ad the right 
to do so by virtue of the power of attorney. 
This guaranty was accepted by the plaintiff 
and respondent in good faith, and based upon the 
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guaranty, extended credit to the Preece Motor Com-
pany. If it had not received the guaranty as execu-
ted, it would not have extended credit, as the record 
shows. Relying upon the gU!aranty agreement, the 
plaintif and respondent extended credit, and as a 
result thereof suffered a loss in excess of $10,000.00. 
The father, Wm. V. Preece, was a substantial own-
er of the corporation, and by the extension of credit 
to the corpo:rtation had the possibility of being bene-
fited by the same. 
It would seem to us that it would be outrageous 
to permit the appellant, Wm. V. Preece, to avoid 
this obligation under the facts and circumstances 
in ~this case. Freed Finance Company was an in-
nocent party to the transaction, and based upon the 
document as presented to it, extended credit. 
It is hard to believe that W. J. Preece would, 
without authority and with intent to deceive 'and 
defraud, forge his father's signature to a docu-
ment. Therefore, W. J. Preece no doubt believed 
honestly and sincerely that he had the power and 
authority to execute the sam·e for 1and on behalf of 
his father, under and by virtue of the power of 
attorney. If he, W. J. Preece, believed it was still 
in force and effect, there ·apparently was no termin-
ation date 'agreed upon and it was to remain in 
force and effect until terminated. 
It must be remembered that the father and the 
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son, Wm. V. Preece and W. J. Preece, respectively, 
were engaged in the au to mobile business and at 
the time in question were operating it under a corp-
orate entity, having transferred their partnership 
interests to the corporation. 
The Utah cases cited by the appellant on page 
twenty of his brief do not apply to the factual situ-
ation in this case. 
The power of attorney specifically provides 
that it is to be in respect to all rna tters of 'any nature 
whatsoever in which he, Wm. V. Preece, may be 
interested or concerned. 
Wm. V. Preece had a very substantial interest 
in the business of the corporation, being a large 
stockholder. The execution of Exhibit 1 was certain-
ly for his benefit as a stockholder. Wm. V. Preece 
'admitted that there was never any conversation 
with his son as to the time limit of the power of 
attorney fTr. 39). 'This negative, without question, 
the implication that Wm. V. Preece now tries to 
introduce into this case, that is, that it was his 
intent that it should only apply while he was on 
his mission. That is, that it was to terminate wlien 
he returned from his mission. This was not con-
veyed to his son. W. V. 'Preece testified ('Tr. 103) 
that there was no a'greement to the effect that the 
power of attorney was only to prevail while he, 
W. V. Preece, was absent from the states. This, 
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wilthout question, disposes of the appellant's argu-
ment in his 'brief that it was the 'intent that the 
power of attorney was only to be in force during 
his absence from the states while on his mission. W. 
J. Preece ('Tr. 93), in answer to counsel's question 
tha!t the power df attorney was given for the duration 
of the absence from the state or the country by 
his father, and th!a:t his father so advised him, stated 
very emphatically: "No, sir, he didn't. This is three 
times I have told you that". 
Under the testimony as we have set forth in 
this brief, could it be said that the son, W. J. Preece, 
was told that the duration was only for the mission, 
and that it should only be exercised during his 
father's absence from the states? 'The answer is, 
of course, no. We feel that it would be a misC'arriage 
of justice to now permit the father, who was a sub-
stantial stockholder of the corporation, ljust because 
there is now a loss, to repudiate a power of at-
torney given without any conversation as to its 
duration; no time fixed in the power of attorney 
for its termination; and the son, acting in accordance 
with his understanding of the power of aJttorney, 
to now have it repudiated? 
Without question, the father, Wm. V. Preece, 
did not intrdouce any evidence whatsoever, or did 
he susta:in the proof that there was a termination 
date, or that it was an agreement between the par-
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ties that it should be only for the duration of the 
mission. 
The evidence is to the contrary. What was in 
his mind is not evidence, and cannot be controling. 
Certainly, Wm. V. Preece cannot sustain a re-
versal of the trial court's judgment, based upon an 
assumption of what he thought it was, or what his 
in tent was, which was not expressed orally or in 
writing. It would be outrageous for W. V. Preece to 
repudiate a power of attorney by saying it was his 
intent, although not expressed in writing or orally, 
that a power of attorney was to be for a period of 
his mission. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of this plaintiff and respon-
dent that the power of attorney definitely empow-
ered W. J. Preece to execute the guaranty; that in 
view of no definite time of duration, and the fact 
that there was no agreement between the parties 
as to its termination date, that it remained in full 
force and effect until terminated by the principal. 
This having never been done, the guaranty as ex-
ecuted by W. J. Preece for and on behalf of Wm. V. 
Preece, was valid and binding. 
It is the further position of this plaintiff and 
respondent that there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's finding and con-
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elusion and judgmen!t. It cannot be contended that 
the judgment entered by the trial court does not 
find support in the evidence. Without any question 
of 'a doubt, the evidence as introduced supports the 
judgment of the trial court. !There is evidence di-
rectly supporting the trial court's decision and, 
therefore, the judgment should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER & KESLER 
By Louis H. Callister 
Attorneys for Freed Finance 
Company, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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